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ARGUMENT 
Appellee raises four main arguments in its brief: first, that Appellant's 
argument for vagueness is based on a subsection under which he was not charged, 
sec [• „.••;>'.•• ' \ "• ' \' ' : . i.'igua^ L • • i^a^o^/ 
bi. Appellee at 12-13; third, that Appellant's reading would lead to defeating the 
intent of the statutory scheme, see br. Appellee at 13-14; and finally, that the 
administrative rule does not render the statute vague, see br. Appellee at 14. 
Appellant will answer each oi these claims. 
App< 
, p p - ! ' , ! 1 - . . * •• / * i n - -1 * '•' - N F - 1 - ^ ' 
argument. Appellant only refers to Rule 5 8-1-4(a) as an interpretive guide in 
interpreting the meaning of 58-1-4(b). As Appellee properly points out in page 13 
of its brief, statutes should be construed as a whole. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12, ' | f ! ) ; Stt tie v I I laestas, _ -._
 :creiorc. >ne language of 
si lbsec tion (b) ;;:>f" 1:1 l e i I lie si I :n lid be given a similar i it leaning to si lbsection (a) 
The plain language of Rule 58-1-4(b) is vague. 
Appellee argues that the plain language of the statute is not vague. ^ 
illustrate this, Appellee argues that Appellant's argument leads to the conclusion 
iiiai .... animuis inc^ns --jine animai... _ :. ippenc a. . . :..wever5 it is not 
Appellant's interpretatioi I : f the stati ite that does this bi it i athei 1:1 ie plain, language 
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of the rule itself. Rule 5 8-1-4(a) provides that "no animal, poultry or bird of any 
species or other animal including wildlife" can be imported into Utah without 
permission of the state and federal government. When reading this subsection of 
the rule, animal can either be read to be all inclusive, as in the definition from the 
agricultural code, see Utah Code Ann. 4-14-2(3), and all words following it are 
assumed to be surplusage. It can also be read to mean certain types of animals 
exclusive of poultry, birds of any species, or other animals including wildlife. 
Since statutory language should be read to give effect to all the words of a statute 
and to avoid surplusage, Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, ^J13, the 
reading of animals as exclusive of poultry, birds of any species, and other animals 
including wildlife is reasonable. This reading is bolstered by the fact that Rule 58-
l-4(b) refers not only to animals, but also to poultry as creatures that should 
receive veterinary inspection. The fact that four classes of creatures were referred 
to in subsection (a), and two of those same classes were referred to in subsection 
(b) but not the other two classes suggests strongly that the omission of birds of any 
species and other animals including wildlife is intentional and has meaning. See 
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998). Appellee's appeal to 
plain language only works if the reader ignores an entire subsection of the rule, 
something that both parties argue that the court should not do. If the rule is read as 
a whole, the rule lends itself to two reasonable interpretations, and therefore "fails 
5 
to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited." State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App. 217 \l 1. 
Appellant's reading of the statute does not defeat the statutory scheme to the 
degree that Appellant's reading becomes unreasonable. 
Appellee argues that Appellant's reading defies common sense because it 
would defeat the purpose of the rule. However, Appellee neither describes the 
purpose of the rule nor explains why Appellant's interpretation would defeat that 
purpose. Appellant's interpretation is that the statute may be read to require 
permission before importing any creature "that is known to be affected with or has 
been exposed to a contagious, infectious or communicable disease, or that 
originates from a quarantined area," Rule 5 8-1-4(a), but only requires veterinary 
inspection of poultry and animals exclusive of wildlife and non-poultry birds (i.e. 
livestock). The rules committee could reasonably believe that veterinary inspection 
for creatures not usually in the control of humans is unnecessary and trust that the 
prohibition on importing animals from quarantine areas would be sufficient. 
Whether or not this interpretation is the correct interpretation, it is not 
unreasonable to the point that would resolve conflicting interpretations of the rule. 
Appellant's interpretation of Rule 58-1-4 can be read as part of a statutory 
scheme. 
6 
Appellee argues that even if Rule 58-1-4 is subject to two conflicting 
interpretations, the underlying statute should resolve any ambiguity. However, 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 only states that importing wildlife is a misdemeanor 
"except as provided in . . . a rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board." 
The statute itself is wholly dependent on administrative rules to provide clarity. 
The applicable Wildlife Board rule is Rule 657-53-21, which identifies the 
determinative rule as Rule 58-1-4. Appellant's interpretation of Rule 58-1-4 can 
reasonably be read consistently with the statute and other rules to defer to the 
decisions of the Department of Agriculture in deciding which creatures need to be 
given veterinary inspection and which do not. Rule 58-1-4 is the sole determining 
rule that provides whether an incoming creature needs a veterinary inspection or 
not. The vagueness of the statute renders the entire statutory scheme vague. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 58-1-4 is unconstitutionally vague. This Court should reverse the 
decision of the Second District Court and remand for appropriate proceedings. 
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